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Obama’s Nuclear Weapons Policy 
in a Changing World 
Andrew Futter
The role that nuclear weapons should play in US security policy has divided analysts and policymakers since “the bomb” was first used in 1945, and has been a particularly important 
question facing US presidents since the end of the Cold War. Essentially this is because in the 
post-Cold War world it has become clear that the US no longer needs the many thousands of 
nuclear warheads originally intended to deter the Soviet Union in order to deal with the new 
types of threats – from rogue states or even terrorists – that currently dominate US security 
thinking. In fact, many believe that retaining large stockpiles of nuclear weapons worldwide 
will increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons technology will proliferate to other actors 
hostile to the US around the globe, which may one day be used. However, this has not translated 
directly into coherent policy towards nuclear reductions, or indeed created unambiguous 
political support for nuclear elimination. George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush 
all made steps in this direction – with varying degrees of success, and with different political 
aims in mind – but Barack Obama is the first post-Cold War US president to truly embrace the 
issue of nuclear abolition, and to make reducing US reliance on such weapons a central priority. 
Obama took office promising considerable change in US nuclear weapons thinking, the centrepiece of 
which would be his very public desire to reignite the quest for “global nuclear zero”. The new president 
hoped that progress could be made towards this goal by embarking on a three-pronged strategy during 
his first term in office. First, this would involve a concerted effort with Russia to make further cuts in 
both powers’ strategic nuclear arsenals – a prerequisite for any further multilateral nuclear reductions 
involving the other seven nuclear powers.1 Second, and in order to allow for this, Obama intended to 
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US security policy by gradually increasing the role of advanced 
non-nuclear weaponry to perform functions previously covered by nuclear weapons. Third, Obama 
would work to prevent the spread and possible use of nuclear weapons by actors hostile to the United 
States through a renewed approach to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security internationally. 
The Obama administration’s approach to nuclear policy has been framed by the changing nature of US 
power and threats to US security in the post-Cold War, post-9-11, and possibly post-unipolar world. 
This is because the past two decades have seen a gradual shift away from the centrality of great power 
politics and nuclear rivalry with Russia and China in US policy, towards a greater focus on rogue state and 
terrorist nuclear threats, and this is strongly reflected in Obama’s approach to US nuclear weapons thinking. 
1  In addition to the US and Russia; Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea & Israel are nuclear weapons states (although Israel remains 
an “undeclared nuclear power”).
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Specifically, it would appear that his determination to 
reduce and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 
technology to these actors is a direct result of the 
belief that other counter-proliferation options are 
perhaps no longer open to him, and that reliance upon 
nuclear deterrence is no longer sufficient. In this sense, 
Obama’s room for manoeuvre in nuclear policy has 
been limited both by the changing nature of threats 
to US security in the 21st century, and by perceptions 
of US power in a post-Bush, and particularly post-Iraq, 
international context. 
REDUCING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS HELD WORLDWIDE
Despite a considerable reduction in the number of 
nuclear weapons held worldwide since the end of 
the Cold War, as Barack Obama took office in January 
2009, it was estimated that over 20,000 warheads were 
held by the nine “nuclear weapons states”, of which 
the vast majority belonged to the United States and 
Russia. Even considering that a large number of these 
weapons are now held in reserve or are waiting to be 
decommissioned, such nuclear ordinance is still more 
than enough to destroy the world many times over. It 
was in this context that Barack Obama announced his 
intention to reignite the global nuclear disarmament 
agenda – which many had felt had stagnated – 
and to begin a new push for nuclear reductions. 
 
Obama had made his views on nuclear weapons and 
nuclear abolition clear before becoming president, 
but it was during a speech in the Czech capital, 
Prague, in April 2009 that his quest for “global zero” 
became truly acknowledged. During the speech, 
the president announced his “intention to seek a 
world free from the threat of nuclear weapons”, and 
argued that because the US was the “only power 
to have used a nuclear weapon”, he and his fellow 
countrymen had a “moral responsibility to act” by 
leading the disarmament agenda. Although also 
noting that “this goal will not be reached quickly – 
perhaps not in my lifetime”, the speech thrust the 
issue into the centre of the international political 
agenda, and ensured that nuclear disarmament 
would become a defining part of his presidency. 
The first step towards this goal would be 
the negotiation of a New Strategic Arms 
Reductions Treaty with Russia to replace 
START I (due to expire in December 2009), which was 
also seen as a logical first step to launch the nuclear 
disarmament agenda globally. The new treaty would 
take almost a year to agree, with Russian officials keen 
to link nuclear reductions with limits to US missile 
defence plans, and US officials equally keen to ensure 
that the two issues remained separate. In the end a 
compromise was reached whereby no official limits 
on US missile defence plans were contained in the 
treaty, but through language in the preamble and 
unilateral Russian statements which accompanied 
it, missile defence and nuclear reductions remained 
loosely linked, at least rhetorically. After the treaty was 
signed in April 2010, it would be a further ten months 
before it was ratified by the US Senate and signed 
into law by Obama in February 2011. Again, the link 
between missile defence and nuclear reductions was 
central to the disagreement, as many US Senators 
strove to ensure that neither the preamble to the 
treaty, nor the Russian unilateral statement, in any 
way inhibited US missile defence plans. The New 
START Treaty limits US and Russian deployed strategic 
nuclear warheads to 1550, and deployed delivery 
vehicles (i.e. ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers) to 700, each. 
 
Both the Prague speech and New START are important 
steps on the nuclear disarmament agenda, but 
progress should not be overstated. The Prague 
speech was essentially about placing the issue of 
nuclear disarmament back into the mainstream public 
domain, and the New START treaty was the first 
tentative step on what looks set to be a very long 
road towards achieving this goal. Significant further 
US and Russian nuclear reductions will probably be 
needed before the other nuclear powers – with their 
far smaller nuclear arsenals – can credibly be brought 
into disarmament talks. Moreover, as was shown by 
the negotiations over New START, whether Russia 
would be interested in future reductions without a link 
to US missile defence plans, and whether Obama – or 
any US president – would either want to do this, or 
be able to get such a deal ratified by the Senate, casts 
considerable doubt on the future of this endeavour.
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DECREASING THE IMPORTANCE OF  NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS FOR US SECURITY
As well as reigniting the quest for global zero 
internationally, and in order to bolster this agenda, 
Obama has been equally keen to revamp thinking 
about the role and utility of nuclear weapons in US 
national security. In fact, building on several policies 
begun during the Bush administration, the president 
has demonstrated a strong tendency to utilise advanced 
conventional weaponry – such as missile defence and 
Prompt Global Strike (PGS) programmes – for roles 
previously performed by nuclear weapons. In doing 
this, it appears that Obama both hopes to reduce US 
reliance upon nuclear weapons in order to aid the 
international push for disarmament, and at the same 
time, reconfigure US national security and nuclear 
weapons thinking to the changing requirements of 
the post-Cold War world. Specifically, this involves a 
more nuanced conception of nuclear deterrence – once 
based solely on mutually assured destruction with the 
Soviet Union – towards a posture able to address the 
different nuclear concerns now facing the US. In this 
sense, Obama has striven to find a balance between 
nuclear and conventional weapons that better reflects 
current US security requirements.
Obama has made it clear that as long as other states 
possess nuclear weapons the US will not give up its 
own nuclear capability, but this does not mean that 
he has not sought to modify the role and importance 
of nuclear weapons in US security thinking. Perhaps 
one of the most notable developments in this regard 
was the declaration in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture 
Review that the US would not use nuclear weapons 
against any non-nuclear weapons state in compliance 
with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While this 
does not rule out the use of such weapons against 
North Korea, Iran, or some other future nuclear pariah, 
and perhaps does not go as far as many might have 
hoped, it does represent an important change of 
thinking. In fact, many hope that this may be the 
precursor to a declaration of no first nuclear use by 
the United States against any state at some point in 
the near future. In doing this, Obama has attempted 
to decrease the perceived centrality of nuclear 
weapons to US security, and therefore by implication, 
as a component in other states’ security planning. 
To an extent, the plan to reduce the role of nuclear 
weapons in US security – while underpinned by the 
goal of global zero – has only been made possible 
because new technologies and the changing 
requirements of US security have allowed non-
nuclear weaponry to perform functions previously 
considered the preserve of nuclear weapons. The 
most notable development in this regard has been 
the increased role and importance of ballistic missile 
defence – a programme that Obama appeared to 
have little enthusiasm for before 2009. In fact, Obama 
initially appeared destined to reduce the role of missile 
defence to ensure that it did not become a spoiler in 
US-Russian arms control negotiations. The reality is 
that Obama has been striving for a balance whereby 
missile defence can be used to bolster deterrence 
against rogue nuclear threats where nuclear retaliation 
may not be seen to be sufficient, while at the same 
time ensure that these missile defence plans do not 
undermine nuclear reductions with Russia – upon 
which the entire disarmament agenda must initially 
be based. As a result, although the missile defence 
programme has been recalibrated, it remains almost 
as important to Obama as it was to Bush (although 
for different reasons). The decision to replace the 
“Third Site” with the “Phased Adaptive Approach” in 
September 2009, rather than cancel missile defence in 
Europe entirely, as well as the comprehensive February 
2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review are examples 
of the president’s commitment to the programme. 
When combined with advances in systems such as 
Prompt Global Strike, it is clear that the Obama 
administration wishes to place increasing emphasis 
on non-nuclear weapons to perform roles previously 
undertaken by nuclear weapons, and that this should 
make it easier to reduce US nuclear weapons further. 
 
Obama has made progress in reducing the utility of 
nuclear weapons to US security thinking, and this should 
theoretically make it easier to decrease the number 
of weapons in the US nuclear stockpile. However, 
a growing US reliance on advanced conventional 
weaponry at the expense of nuclear weapons may 
paradoxically make the global disarmament agenda 
more difficult. Essentially, the vast comparative 
advantage that the US enjoys both qualitatively and 
quantitatively in conventional weaponry may simply 
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serve to make nuclear weapons more desirable to 
other nations. Moreover, a combination of a non-
nuclear strike capability, combined with a missile 
defence and advanced monitoring technologies, may 
cause other nations to fear the development of a US 
non-nuclear first strike capability, which in turn may 
lead others to develop more, and more sophisticated, 
nuclear weapons. Striking a balance between 
domestic and international nuclear disarmament 
strategies therefore seems likely to be another key 
issue for the future of Obama’s nuclear agenda. 
 
PREVENTING THE SPREAD AND POSSIBLE USE 
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THOSE HOSTILE TO 
THE US
Obama’s strong desire to reduce both the number and 
utility of nuclear weapons is essentially a reflection of 
strategic realties. Put simply, large numbers of nuclear 
weapons arguably appear to represent a graver threat 
to US security in the post-9-11 world than perhaps 
they did during much of the Cold War. The reason for 
this is twofold: first is the emergence of rogue states 
such as North Korea, Iran, and potentially others, 
intent on acquiring a nuclear weapons capability; 
the second is that fact that as nuclear technology 
and weaponry continue to proliferate and spread, 
the chance of them falling into the hands of terrorist 
groups, and the possibility of their use, increases 
exponentially. Obama has therefore fought to re-
establish the norm of nuclear non-proliferation 
internationally, in part through the Prague speech 
and the New START Treaty, but also though a 
revamped approach to the issue of nuclear security. 
 
In the current international climate, the greatest 
nuclear threat to the US comes from either a 
rogue state or a terrorist organisation attacking, or 
threatening to attack the US with a nuclear weapon. 
The proliferation of nuclear and missile technology 
after the Cold War has forced Obama (and other 
presidents before him) to elevate these concerns to the 
top of the US national security agenda. Conventional 
wisdom holds that because these new post-Cold 
War threats may not be manageable solely through 
nuclear deterrence, or addressed through either US 
conventional weaponry or diplomacy, then the only 
other option open to Obama is to prevent the spread 
of nuclear material and weaponry to these actors in 
the first place. Again, the president has made this 
a top priority for his administration, most notably 
by convening the Nuclear Security Summit in April 
2010, and through his public commitment to the 
NPT. In both of these endeavours, Obama has sought 
to strengthen international nuclear non-proliferation 
norms, and make it harder for states to acquire nuclear 
technology. A second Obama term may see progress 
on other policies towards this end, including a Fissile 
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and an attempt to ratify 
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
 
However, at the same time, the administration’s 
progress on dealing with rogue state nuclear threats 
has been negligible. Renewed diplomatic approaches 
to both North Korea and Iran have born little fruit; 
Pyongyang conducted a second underground nuclear 
test in 2009 and has not rejoined the six-party talks, 
while international pressure has seemed to make little 
impact on Iran’s quest to acquire a nuclear capability. 
Failure to deal with these threats opens up further 
concerns about the potential for nuclear technology 
to proliferate, and perhaps end up in the hands of 
terrorists. In this sense, and although Obama has 
tried to distance himself from some of the counter-
proliferation policies of the previous administration, 
whether diplomacy alone can continue as the main 
response to the threats posed by nuclear proliferation 
remains to be seen.
FUTURE TRENDS AND TRAJECTORIES IN US 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY
While the total number of nuclear weapons in the 
world has decreased considerably from the very high 
levels that dominated the Cold War, the possibility 
that these weapons might one day be used remains 
ever-present, and according to some, even more likely 
in the post-9-11 world. The horizontal proliferation 
of nuclear technology to more international actors 
– although perhaps not as extensive as previously 
feared – has nevertheless created an entirely new 
set of circumstances for US nuclear planners, 
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whereby principles of rationality and mutually 
assured destruction are no longer held as inviolable. 
The growing risk that a rogue state or a terrorist 
organisation may acquire and use these weapons 
has created an entirely new set of dynamics for the 
US to consider, and has essentially changed the rules 
of the nuclear game. It is for this reason that nuclear 
policy, reducing nuclear weapons, and preventing 
their proliferation, remains central to both US foreign 
policy and to international security. 
Barack Obama has certainly recognised this, and 
his policy triumvirate of nuclear reductions, nuclear 
substitution, and proliferation prevention, represents a 
coherent and logical attempt to address the changing 
nature of nuclear threats to US security. In a sense, he 
has tried to deal with the nuclear threat diplomatically 
from either end of the spectrum; top down by pursuing 
nuclear arms reductions with Russia and agreeing on 
the New START Treaty, and bottom up by addressing 
the proliferation of the technology needed to acquire 
a nuclear weapons capability through initiatives such 
as the Nuclear Security Summit. He has also sought to 
reignite the nuclear non-proliferation norm by reducing 
US reliance on nuclear weapons, altering US declaratory 
nuclear policy, and by throwing his wholehearted 
support behind the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. These efforts would appear to be a prudent 
attempt to get to grips with the changing realities 
of US power and the types of security challenges US 
policymakers face in the current international climate. 
 
However, the future trajectory of Obama’s nuclear 
thinking appears less assured, and it seems he will 
be faced with three key problems if he is to continue 
upon the path set out so far. First is the question of 
how the president can convince Russia to agree to 
reduce their nuclear stockpile down to levels that will 
allow the nuclear disarmament agenda to become 
multilateralised. This will not only involve somehow 
reassuring Moscow about US missile defence plans, but 
also winning over domestic opinion in the US to the 
idea of further (possibly unilateral) American nuclear 
reductions. Second, and linked to this, will be how far 
Obama goes in substituting advanced conventional 
weaponry for nuclear weapons in US security policy. 
This policy may well make nuclear reductions more 
acceptable in the US, but it seems likely to become 
a diplomatic and strategic stumbling block for the 
disarmament agenda internationally. This is because 
greater US conventional superiority will make nuclear 
weapons more, not less, important to strategic 
competitors and other potential challengers. Finally, 
Obama will need to come to a decision soon about 
whether a nuclear Iran and North Korea are acceptable 
dangers to US security, or whether something must be 
done to remove these threats. Linked to this will be 
how far the President decides to go in pushing for a 
full range of international non-proliferation measures, 
and to whether he can achieve a nuclear materials 
“lockdown” through the FMCT and CTBT in a possible 
second term. Should he win the next election, Obama’s 
future nuclear policy seems likely to have to reflect a 
political and strategic balance between the top-down 
policies required for nuclear reductions (initially with 
Russia) and the bottom-up policies required for nuclear 
security and non-proliferation (caused by the changing 
nature of nuclear threats to US security). As long as 
“global zero” and nuclear disarmament remain at 
the forefront of the US political debate – which the 
changing requirements of US security suggest that they 
will – addressing these dynamics will be an enduring 
question for US nuclear policy regardless of who wins 
the next election. ■
